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Hair product fails to meet Federal Trade
Commission Act standard for effectiveness
by Julianne Moody
In Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Pantron I Corp., 33
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that representing a
hair loss product as "effective" when its efficacy was
due solely to a placebo effect constituted false advertis-
ing in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA"). It also held that dissatisfied consumers were
entitled to restitution for injuries resulting from such
false advertising as monetary equitable relief could be
awarded for violations of the Act. Finally, the court
declined to disturb the district court's finding that, under
the FTCA, the hair loss product was a drug as consum-
ers could reasonably believe that the product would
affect the structure or function of the body.
Seller claims product promotes hair growth
The Pantron I Corporation ("Pantron"), owned by
Hal Z. Lederman, marketed a shampoo and conditioner
called "The Helsinki Formula" ("Formula"). Pantron
advertised that this product arrested hair loss while
stimulating regrowth in baldness sufferers. As part of
these advertisements, Pantron stated that scientific
studies supported their claims about the product's
efficacy. Consumers were offered a full refund if there
was any dissatisfaction with the product.
Pantron's advertisements came to the attention of a
number of regulatory agencies, including the United
States Postal Service and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. On November 18, 1988, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") filed suit against Pantron seeking
a permanent injunction and monetary equitable relief. In
its complaint, the FTC alleged that Pantron's claims
regarding the efficacy of the Formula violated the FTCA
as they constituted false and deceptive advertising.
Specifically, the FTC contended that the Formula was
ineffective in treating hair loss in the absence of accept-
able scientific proof demonstrating its successful
treatment of the condition.
At trial, the FTC introduced evidence to prove that
the Formula did not effectively treat hair loss associated
with male pattern baldness. Three expert witnesses
testified that Pantron's studies concluding that its
product was effective failed to satisfy generally accepted
scientific standards in the United States. Other studies,
which did satisfy inquiry standards, demonstrated that
the Formula's key ingredients were ineffective in
reducing hair loss or promoting hair growth. Testimony
from these experts suggested that the Formula had no
effectiveness in arresting hair loss or promoting re-
growth beyond its placebo effect.
Pantron countered these claims with evidence from
users who were satisfied with the product. Survey data
demonstrated that Formula users reported successful
results, ranging from 30% for those who had used the
product for less than two months to 70% for those who
had used the product for six months or more. Addition-
ally, Pantron introduced several studies of its own that
concluded that the product was effective for treating hair
loss.
On September 24, 1991, the district court first
determined that while Pantron had made the claims of
efficacy alleged, the FTC had failed to prove that the
Formula was entirely ineffective. The court found that
the evidence suggested that the Formula may work for
some people some of the time. It concluded therefore
that the FTC had failed to prove that Pantron's advertis-
ing contained a false claim as to its efficacy. However,
the court did find that the FTC had demonstrated that
Pantron's claims regarding scientific proof of the
product's efficacy were false. Accordingly, it enjoined
Pantron from making representations that the product's
efficacy had been demonstrated through scientific study.
However, the injunction permitted Pantron to state that
the product had been subjected to European medical
investigations if accompanied with a disclosure stating
that such work did not conform to the standards for
scientific medical studies in this country. Moreover, the
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order allowed Pantron to state that the Formula was
effective to some extent for some people. This state-
ment, however, had to be qualified by an additional
disclosure stating that the product more likely arrested
hair loss rather than promoted regrowth and that the
efficacy claim was not supported by studies meeting the
rigor of the scientific community in the United States.
Additionally, the district court, in its order, concluded
that the Formula was a drug as defined by the FTCA.
Finally, the court awarded no monetary equitable relief
because the FTC had failed to establish that Pantron had
caused actual deception and injury or that Lederman
knew or should have known that the advertising was
fraudulent.
The FTC appealed the district court's decision.
Specifically, it challenged the narrowness of the district
court's injunction and the denial of any monetary
equitable relief. Pantron cross-appealed from the court's
ruling that the Formula was a drug under the FVCA.
Material representations likely to mislead
consumers constitute false advertising
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit first examined the language of the FTCA.
It noted that the FTCA defines a false advertisement as
"an advertisement, other than labeling, which is mislead-
ing." An advertisement is misleading or deceptive if it
involves a material representation, omission, or practice
that is likely to mislead the reasonable consumer. In the
case at hand, there was no dispute that Pantron claimed
that the Formula was effective against hair loss and that
such claims were material. The only disputed issue was
whether these misrepresentations would likely mislead a
reasonable consumer.
The court observed that while there were a number of
ways to determine whether a representation, omission,
or practice would mislead a reasonable consumer within
the meaning of the FTCA, the government here pre-
mised its argument on the falsity theory. Under the
falsity theory, the government must prove that the
advertisement's express or implied message was false.
Looking at the evidence, the court of appeals found
that the overwhelming weight of proof at the trial clearly
indicated that any efficacy demonstrated by the Formula
was due to the product's placebo effect. It therefore held
that the district court had erred in concluding that
Pantron's representations about the Formula were not
false advertising. Specifically, it stated that the district
court had misapprehended the law when it required the
FTC to prove that the hair loss product was "wholly
ineffective" in order to prevail under the falsity theory.
Because the court concluded that a claim of product
effectiveness is false if the evidence developed under
accepted standards of scientific research demonstrated
that the product had only a placebo effect, it held that
Pantron's material misrepresentations regarding the
Formula's efficacy would likely mislead the consumer
and constituted false advertizing under the FTCA.
In light of this ruling, the court of appeals instructed
the district court to revise its injunction and prohibit
Pantron from making any statement regarding the
Formula's efficacy for some people. Furthermore, the
circuit court ruled that the injunction must be further
modified to indicate that any statement detailing the
European studies must be qualified by the following
disclosures: (1) the United States scientific testing
standards are stricter than those in Europe; (2) studies
using American standards have researched the Formula;
and (3) these studies unanimously have concluded that
the Formula is ineffective.
Pantron ordered to pay consumers restitution
Turning to the issue of monetary equitable relief, the
appellate court observed that restitution serves as an
adequate remedy when the advertiser has substantially
benefitted from his illegal conduct, even if individual
damages were minimal. The FTCA grants federal courts
broad authority to issue restitution, in addition to
injunctions, for violations of the Act.
On review, the court of appeals held, as a matter of
law, that the district court's reasoning for denying
monetary equitable relief had been flawed. First, the
appellate court stated that it was immaterial whether the
consumer injuries were only economic in nature.
Second, the amount of the injury suffered by each
individual consumer was irrelevant in assessing whether
restitution was an appropriate remedy. Rather, the
district court should have looked to the aggregate
consumer injury as that reflected the total damage
caused by the seller's conduct. Finally, the court of
appeals stated that the promise of a full refund was an
insufficient reason to deny restitution. The court
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therefore concluded that consumer restitution was
proper. Restitution would eliminate the profits Pantron
had obtained through its false advertising and address
the economic injury experienced by the dissatisfied
consumers.
The court of appeals also found Lederman, Pantron's
president and sole owner, was personally liable for the
monetary award as he had been aware of the false
advertising. The court held that Lederman acted with
"reckless indifference to the truth or falsity"of the
representations made about the Formula. It reasoned that
Lederman knew or should have known about the
misrepresentations as several government agencies had
notified him regarding that issue. Additionally, there was
overwhelming evidence that no scientific study sup-
ported the product's efficacy claim.
The Formula is a drug
Formula as a drug. It noted that the FTCA defines drugs
as "articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or function of the body of man or other
animals." The circuit court noted that Pantron, in its
advertisements, claimed that the Formula would cause
hair growth where no hair currently existed. A reason-
able consumer could construe that as a claim promising
to affect the structure of the scalp, rather than a tempo-
rary and superficial change in appearance. The circuit
court concluded that the district court had not erred in
determining that the Formula was a drug.
The circuit court remanded the case back to the
district court for modification of the injunctive order
limiting the scope of Pantron's advertisements for the
Formula. Additionally, the district court was instructed
to order Pantron and Lederman to pay monetary
equitable relief for injuries caused by their false adver-
tising of the Formula.
The court then turned to the issue of Pantron's cross-
appeal of the district's court's characterization of the
Credit card payments due on Sunday must be
received by Sunday
by Jennifer L. Fitzgerald
In Lamed v. First Chicago
Corp., 636 N.E.2d 1004 (IIl.App.Ct.
1994), the court held that a credit
card agreement between the issuer
and the card holder could validly
exclude the Illinois Bank Holiday
Act. The issuer could impose
finance charges against a holder
whose payment was due on Sunday,
but received on Monday. Further-
more, the court held that a credit
card agreement was not an unen-
forceable adhesion contract.
Class Action Suit Against First
Chicago For Finance Charges
Incurred
On October 24, 1990, William J.
Lamed ("Lamed") filed a class
action lawsuit on behalf of all
holders of credit cards issued by the
defendants, First Chicago Corpora-
tion ("First Chicago") and its wholly
owned subsidiary FCC National
Bank ("First Card"). Plaintiff
alleged that: (1) the defendants'
practice of assessing finance charges
for payments due on Sunday, but
received on Monday was contrary to
the Illinois Bank Holiday Act
("Holiday Act") 205 ILCS 630/17
(West 1992); (2) the choice of law
provision in the contract was
unenforceable; and (3) the agree-
ment was a contract of adhesion.
The Illinois Holiday Act provides
that where indebtedness is due on
Sunday, the debtor has until the
following Monday to pay the debt
without accruing finance charges.
However, defendants claimed that
they, as a national bank, could not be
prohibited from collecting payments
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